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Abstract 
This article proposes a reading of the armed conflict from an evolutionary design that takes 
into account the concept of private protection agencies in the works of Schelling / Nozick / 
Gambetta. Their aim is to assess the dynamics of conflict and changes from its author's 
scientific output. A context of conflicts that includes new expressions of violence and the 
relative failure of the paramilitary reintegration involves using new analytical models 
(argumentation, game theory and inconsistent information). The recent evolution of emerging 
gangs and their expansion into areas that were paramilitary camps requires monitoring not 
only of the government and the authorities, but those investigating the conflict in the present 
tense. The author provides heuristic research support from Schelling’s theory of strategy, 
Nozick’s agencies and the protection, and Gambetta’s recent contributions to the relationship 
between organized crime and drug cartels. 
Keyword: Civil War, Colombia, armed conflict, drug trafficking, organized crime, 
paramilitary counterinsurgency war, Game Theory and inconsistent information. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The Colombian armed conflict has evolved over the last decade. However, this 
evolution has not necessarily been reflected in the analyses of some researchers who 
have heavily influenced public opinion. The following hypotheses are the most 
relevant for the questions that will be raised in this article: 
 2 
1. Neither an armed conflict nor a civil war exist in Colombia: the para-state 
groups have disarmed, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(hereafter referred to as the FARC) and the National Liberation Army 
(hereafter referred to as the ELN) are being defeated (official version upheld 
by the Uribe government according to José Obdulio Gaviria, Posada Carbó 
and Alfredo Rangel
1
)  
2. Due to their causal relationship, violence and the conflict in general have 
evolved in a uniform manner.  As such, present examples of both can be 
explained using similar methods (Daniel Pecaut)
2
.  
3. Colombian violence manifested in diverse modalities (such as homicides, 
crime and massacres) is derived from the armed conflict; and vice versa, the 
armed conflict has caused chains of civil violence and state anomie 
(Waldmann)
3
.  
4. In the end, the strategies employed by the guerrillas and the paramilitaries 
have become analogous with regards to both their objectives and their 
procedures. An extended learning curb has demonstrated that their differences 
are minimal (Fernando Cubides, León Valencia)
4
. Premise: Hypotheses to be 
questioned concerning the armed conflict: no armed conflict, violence and 
armed conflict are uniform, violence is derived from armed conflict, guerrillas 
and paras the same,  
5. The driving force behind the functionality of the para-state groups and their 
persistence over the last two decades has been the drugs industry. The drugs 
                                                          
1 José Obdulio Gaviria, Sofismas del terrorismo en Colombia, Bogotá, Editorial Planeta, 2005; Posada Carbó, 
Eduardo, La nación soñada, Bogotá, Editorial Norma, 2006, pp. 388; even though less dogmatic than the 
former in his public position though less dogmatic, the reports and columns of the jouranlist, Alfredo 
Rangel, have echoed in the Uribe government: “Long Live Plan Colombia” (Semana, 21/03/2009); “Alan 
Jara’s absentmindedness” (Semana, 21/02/2009); “What did the FARC last agree on?” (Semana,  
16/03/2008.  Rangel has had a reactionary tendency over the last decade and has defended economic 
sectors that have recieved benefits under the Uribe government.     
2 Daniel Pecaut argues for this hypothesis in his famous article, The past, present and future of the violence: 
“The violence has become a functional mode of society, given the birth of diverse networks that exert 
influence over the population and of official regulations. It is better not to analyse the violence as a 
provional reality. This all suggests that a durable situation has been created, Revista Análisis Político, 30, 
1997, IEPRI, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 
3 Peter Waldmann, Guerra civil, terrorismo y anomia, Bogotá, Editorial Norma, 2007, pp. 304. Waldmann’s 
position reflects a varient interpretation supported by analists whose sources are limited to opinion.  This 
does not constitute an extensive critic of Waldmann’s work in general, but the observations concerning 
Colombia are seen as forced so as to support his hypothesis. The magazine, Revista Análisis Político, has also 
published the article The habilitualization of violence in Colombia   32, sep/dec. 1997. 
4 Fernando Cubides has reviewed the fundamental differences in strategy employed by the paramilitaries 
and the insurgents, and in particular he has focused on the use of intimidation and mutual learning, please 
see: Burocracias armadas, Bogotá, Editorial Norma, p. 200; also please see León Valencia’s report: 
Parapolítica, la ruta de la expansión paramilitar y los acuerdos políticos, Bogotá, Corporación Nuevo Arco 
Iris, 2007, p. 396. 
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economy and other related businesses are fundamental factors in the 
Colombian armed conflict (Duncan, Camacho Guisado)
5
.  
Each hypothesis expresses a predominant analytic focus on the strategic evolution of 
the armed conflict. It must be emphasised that this analytic classification is not meant 
to impose a complete taxonomy and, even less, does it intend to accredit the analysts 
with rigid positions. However, it is contended that to a great extent the classification 
does reflect both academic publications and media sources that generate public 
opinion. Those who believe that Colombia has consolidated a constitutional 
democracy with full guarantees to security and a reduction in violence during the 
Uribe government (1) will also share the hypothesis that the violent out lashes are 
nothing more than revenge and retaliations between the cartels (5). The analysts that 
have explained the conflict through social science categories (3) are found to have 
similar conclusions to those who observe regularities or small differences in the 
conflict over a large period of time (2). Lastly, those that identify and use economic 
variables to explain the conflict will uphold that there is little difference between the 
strategies and the military operatives of the violent actors (4) – (5). Whilst voicing 
their support for the Uribe government, the analysts can uphold hypotheses (1) – (4) – 
(5); or alternatively, they can deny the hypotheses (2) – (3).  
It is obvious that with the evolution of the armed conflict the analysts could offer less 
superficial hypotheses than those articulated above. The armed conflict and displays 
of violence in Colombia are both variant and continuous in kind.  Since the eighties, 
the drugs industry has influenced the illegal trade market including arms, smuggling 
and drugs; but how has this interfered with fundamental sectors of the legal market, 
such as real estate, tourism, transport, and less obviously with poultry sector? How 
does communication operate between organized crime, kidnapping, the guerrillas and 
the paramilitaries? To what extent has the conflict transformed living conditions in 
urban and rural Colombia? Unfortunately, these are questions that have failed to be 
addressed in the conventional interpretations of violence perpetuated after the 60s.  
 
THE HYPOTESIS  
In order to complement previous studies, the present article aims to balance on the 
one the one hand substantiated arguments, and on the other, the strategic evolution of 
the conflict. Taking into account limitations, the reach of the article is confined to 
addressing problems that have been confronted within the last decade (argumentation, 
strategies developed within a civil war and asymmetric information). As such, the 
objective is to present an analysis of the conflict and its recent evolution in the context 
                                                          
5 Duncan, Gustavo, Los señores de la guerra: de paramilitares, mafiosos y autodefensas en Colombia, Bogotá, 
Planeta, 2006. In 1991 Álvaro Camacho Guisado stated: “the drugs industry, without a doubt the newest 
phenomonen and that which characterizes most adequately contemporary violence, a situation that is 
considerably complex, can already explain all the threads of the conflict”, Bogotá, Análisis Político, No. 12, 
Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales (IEPRI), Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 
 4 
of private security actors.  It is contended that the evolutionary state of the conflict 
offers unprecedented aspects with respect to the violence perpetrated in the 60s and 
the war fought between the drugs cartels during the 80s
6
. Contrary to hypothesis (1), 
it is argued that the reinsertion of paramilitary forces as part of a Democratic Security 
policy has not given definitive results
7
. The guerrilla groups have as yet not been 
defeated and the reinserted paramilitaries have merely returned to their organisations 
(in contradiction to hypotheses (1) and (4)). The geographic makeup of the armed 
conflict shows dynamics of territorial competition between paramilitary groups and 
insurgents acting in coalition with drugs cartels [hypothesis (5)]. As a result, the 
evolution of the armed conflict has provided fertile ground for a private security and 
protection market, further demanded by a geographical and territorial transformation
8
. 
Let us sustain that the questions relating to the continuation and evolution of the 
conflict over the last decade are to some extent different to those relating to its 
original causes and embryonic evolution addressed by the principal actors (contrary to 
hypothesis (2)). Taken from this perspective, the various organisations have behaved 
and continue to behave according to their own rationale. However, some analysts feel 
comfortable with characterising the paramilitaries, insurgents and criminal gangs as 
equivalent.  This tautology does not have explanatory force.  In Colombia the actors 
violate common expectations of normal conduct, to an implausible degree.     
An aspect that has received little attention in conventional literature is that the 
majority of those integrated in the para-state groups tend to violate a basic general 
principal: namely, preservation of one’s own life.  This applies to a lesser degree to 
insurgents, and even less to members of criminal organisations.  This violation 
becomes more worrying in as much as the para-state organisations seem to break the 
dictates of instrumental rationality: the actors should preserve their integrity when 
there is a great risk posed against their life. A correlation between unemployment and 
illiteracy and an early intake into the criminal networks weave threads into the 
tapestry of the conflict and present complications for any analysis (contrary to 
hypothesis (5)).   
                                                          
6 A study addressing such changes should identify the profound geo-political and territorial transformations 
that have provoked the armed conflict.  The maps that are in use serve to limit localising the positions of the 
para-state groups, dwarfing greater analytic developments concerning their strategies. The geographic 
dynamic should take into account, for example, local and regional strategies. A systematic comparative 
study of the last half century could demonstrate continuities and identity changes of the principal agents. 
Please see the attempted studies by Reyes, Alejandro (2009); Echandía (2006); Deas, 1999); Pecaut (2008).      
7 While writing this article President Uribe and his government offerred recompensation for information 
concerning 10 ringleaders who are in charge of 10.000 paramilitaries. The expansion of the emerging 
(paramilitary) groups and their armed mobilisation in that territory speaks against the proclaimed end of 
the war in Colombia. See: “Captura de capos de bandas emergentes tendrá la misma prioridad que la de 
máximos jefes guerrilleros”, El Tiempo, 10th March 2009.  
8 The paramilitary and insurgent activity has been especially concentrated in Nariño, Cauca, Meta, (towards 
the Southern); Córdoba, Sucre and la Guajira, (in the Northern regions en las regiones). Please see: “Se crece 
el enano: la expansión de las Águilas Negras” Revista Semana, 05/31/2008.   
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In the explanatory framework of the violence perpetrated in Colombia, geography has 
assumed a secondary role. Research undertaken over the last decade has constructed 
conflict maps that only partially represent the changes that have taken place regarding 
para-state territorial presence. The map still does not differentiate between the 
unprecedented strategies advanced by the organisations, nor does it reveal the 
territorial confrontations between such groups. Further questions need to be 
addressed: How can the geography of the violence help to explain the struggle 
between insurgents and paramilitaries to control the dominant smuggling areas? 
Likewise, how can intra-group incentives explain the distribution and negotiation of 
territories, drugs and arms in border zone? 
These questions expose the need to introduce a geographic dimension to conflict 
analysis.  The conflict maps should address group structure and gauge possible 
changes. Indeed, paramilitary mobility seems to correspond to different factors to that 
of the anti-insurgent movement advanced by the public forces and with the support of 
Carlos Castaño and Salvatore Mancuso.  Significantly, the war of territorial control 
does not seek to displace the ideological enemy, but to compete in the drugs market 
(hypothesis (5)).  Additionally, a geographical map of the conflict ahould addresses 
the changing political dynamics within principal and secondary cities.  A model 
outlining territorial competition strategies between para-state groups and conflicts 
within the organisations is attached in the annex.  
 
WHAT DOES STRATEGIC EVOLUTION MEAN?  
 
According to Schelling
9
, conflict theories can be classified into those that see the 
conflict as a pathological state and study its’ causes and treatment, and those that 
accept the conflict as a fact and analyse the behaviour which arises out of it.  This last 
category is then divided into those theories that comprehensively analyse, in its full 
complexity, all those that participate in a conflict (rational and irrational conduct, 
caculi and motivations), and those theories that consider the actors that act rationally 
in a conflict (competition, generalised beneficial end and means of achieving this 
end). 
 
The latter category is known as conflict strategy.  This article will explore Schelling’s 
notion of conflict strategy with relation to the Colombian conflict for three reasons: a) 
as analysts ourselves, we are taking a position in the conflict; therefore, we want to 
know for what reasons the actors rationally perpetrate violence; b) we have an interest 
                                                          
9 Like few authors, Thomas C. Shelling (1960) has managed to propose an original strategy theory that, due 
to its simplicity, has overcome the complex formulation of the conventional game theory (Newman/Nash). 
Recently Schelling has highlighted the historical and geographical circumstances which led to the formation 
of his model, please see: Jean-Paul Carvalh, “An interview with Thomas Schelling”, Oxonomics 2 (2007) 1 – 8. 
The graphic diagram that we use is also valid (with small differences) according to Nozick, 1974 and 
Gambetta, 1993. 
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in understanding what types of changes and phenomena the principal actors 
experience; c) it is possible that we have a certain degree of influence (direct and 
indirect) over the behaviour and the social representations that spring from the 
conflict, and for that reason, it is important to understand the variables which restrict 
possible action. 
 
Rational conduct is the fundamental factor to be considered in this article.  Indeed, 
Schelling’s diagram suggests that conflict strategy can be understood by analysing 
various characteristics of rational behaviour: the micro behaviour of an individual, the 
miso behaviour of a soldier within an armed group or macro behaviour of the armed 
group in general.  Individuals actions’ are motivated by incentives that can be 
quantified, ranging from basic salary, bonuses and awards for successful operations, 
to goods collected for threat, extortion and blackmail. These explanatory elements can 
by used to construct a coherent account of the rationality for joining one of the armed 
forces (as observed the individual’s motivation may not be violent).  In any case, 
motivation to act is not considered in moral terms when analysing the complex 
structure of rationality.  
 
Limiting conflict studies to strategy theory reduces the understanding of field of 
action solely to rational conduct (as opposed to irrational conduct motivated by 
passion); which is to say, not only to intelligent conduct, but also to conduct 
motivated by a utilitarian calculation of advantages and inconveniences.  Within an 
armed group this is based on a coherent system of values, such as obedience, the 
benefits of lying, punishment, incentives etc. This limited perspective has its 
advantages: it allows for the development of a theory of conflict strategy based on 
rational choice.  
 
Assuming the existence of the conflict and contending that each armed actor has to 
“win” does not necessarily imply that the actors´ interests are in opposition. Only in a 
theoretic case of a pure conflict are the interests of the antagonists in complete 
opposition and the goal is total extermination of the adversary.  However, coalitions 
of otherwise enemy armed forces may form to access economic resources, control 
drugs production and the main transportation routes, protect the population to gain 
local support, negotiate, etc.  As such, competing actors have a common interest.  
This is especially the case in Colombia where there are a plethora of armed groups 
competing in a diverse geographic landscape. Therefore, a gain in the language of a 
conflict does not necessarily translate into gains with respect to the adversary, but 
gains with respect to one of the systems of values (micro, miso and macro).  Within 
the context of a conflict, there must always the possibility of a solution.  The 
possibility of a solution and the common interests between the various armed factions 
creates a mutual inter-dependence. This mutual inter-dependence allows for a diverse 
range of tactics, such as intimidation, threat, disarmament and negotiation, which 
continually change the dynamics of the conflict, specific to time and territory.   
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The mutual inter-dependence has a psychological element.  In one region some armed 
factions may be friends, in another they may be foes, but in either case the various 
groups will never have comprehensive information concerning the others.  For 
example, they will not know the quantity and quality of their arms, their territorial 
control, their resources or the size of their cultivations.  Much of the information that 
they do receive is based on rumour.  The asymmetric and incomplete information 
provides breeding ground for psychological warfare.  Strategy does not have to refer 
to the use of force, but to what Schelling denominates: “the exploitation of potential 
force”.  Due to the lack of information concerning the other armed groups, a 
threatened group to some extent can only hazard a guess at whether a threat can 
actually be followed through.  This strategy affects both the enemy and those who 
form part of the alliance because the aim of the strategy is to deliver a solution that is 
mutually beneficial for all the participants, whether that be negatively avoiding harm 
or positively gaining a benefit.  
 
In terms of the game theory, the most interesting conflicts are not those which add up 
to zero, for example in the Cold War where the enemy forces knew that they had 
equal and opposite power in the form of nuclear weapons which resulted in a strategic 
tie, but those in which the competing factions have asymmetric and incomplete 
information concerning the other, and in which one side does not have to win, but 
both groups can simultaneously gain from a conflict through their common interests. 
In this study, the exploitation of potential force is understood to compare how 
strategies are developed within an organisation (rationality, inter-dependence, friend-
enemy, means of achieving an end) and how competitive strategies (threat, 
intimidation, extortion, fines and taxes) between different groups are developed, in 
key territories. 
 
Threatening the opposition is an important strategy. The use and style of threats has 
been developed in such a way that it now delivers profitable results.  Time has taught 
that for a threat to be successful then it must be believable, and its credibility depends 
on the implied risks and actions to be complied with by the threatening party. As 
such, the efficiency of the threat depends on the rationale of the adversary.  For 
example, the threat of mass destruction can only intimidate an enemy if first, that 
enemy believes that those threatening them have the capacity to mass destruct, and 
second, that there equally exists a possibility not to destruct.  In the case of Colombia, 
the threatening party must be able to take preventative measures to stop the 
confrontations from escalating. Agreements between the government and the 
paramilitaries have intended to limit the capacity of the FARC and the ELN to threat 
and extort
10
.  
                                                          
10 We presented a preliminary paper concerning the roll of indirect communications in typical cases of 
threat and bribery to the First Congress of Political Science, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Noviembre de 
2008, (Estrada Gallego, Fernando, El Soborno y la Amenaza en las Guerras Civiles, La Universidad de la Valle, 
Departamento de Economia, Cali, Colombia, 2008) 
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The process through which the idea of conflict strategy has been developed has been 
considerable slow. The existent theory is very vague and there is little literature that 
applies the theory to the case study of Colombia.  Methodology has not been 
developed concerning the use of threat and the related literature does not provide 
possible solutions to the immediate problems.  Why has there been a lack of 
theoretical development?  The answer lies in the fact that the military services, in 
contrast to almost all other important professions, lack an identifiable academic 
counterpart.  Both the military and the interest groups fail to recognise the relevance 
of the problem.  
 
What would a theory concerning conflict strategy in Colombia address?  Which 
questions would it try to answer? Which ideas would it try to group together, clarify 
or communicate in a more effective manner? To start with, it would have to identify 
the key elements of the conflict and create a typology of the various conducts 
employed by the armed parties (for example the government and the para-state 
groups).  The objective of strategy is to influence the actions of an adversary and to 
induce a desired behaviour, but what system of values provides for the credibility of a 
threat?  All of these questions demonstrate that there is sufficient material to create a 
theory that would help to give greater understanding of the Colombian conflict.  This 
paper will try to answer these questions and will integrate various perspectives into 
the analysis, such as the game theory, inconsistent information, argument analysis and 
collective decision-making.  
 
According to the Conventional Game Theory, violence perpetrated in an armed 
conflict is rationally or irrationally motivated. Some orthodox writers believe it is 
exclusively one or the other. However, it is dogmatic to sustain that violence is only 
rationally motivated because there is no optimal level of rationality used for applying 
violence. Likewise, violence cannot only be motivated by passion because enemies 
will rationalise the best means of achieving benefits, such as drugs production, and 
this may involve an alliance with otherwise enemy forces. Lets say for example that 
soldier A is threatening the family of an enemy soldier B.  B may pay soldier A not to 
harm his family out of fear, which is a passion, or because he rationally deduces that 
A always follows through with his threats. A more nuanced understanding of strategy 
contends that violence is both rationally and irrationally motivated, that which 
Schelling names an inter-dependent decision theory. There is psychological 
dependence between the various groups, and their actions towards each other are both 
rational and irrational. For example, the para-state groups use dates and facts, 
information and estimations concerning the enemy to strategise and the government 
uses expected behavioural patterns attributed to insurgents, paramilitaries and 
organized criminals.  
 
The assumption that, during a conflict, strategic decisions are made using a rational 
framework, implicitly affirms a rational utilitarian theory of action. Many of the 
 9 
critical elements than are integrated into the model of rational conduct can be typified 
as rational or irrational.  This premise obliges us to consider what irrationality means. 
Irrationality is defined as an incoherent and disordered system of values that may lead 
to miscalculations. Information systems, collective decision-making or the parameters 
by which the possibility of error is represented or loss of control can be considered as 
an intent to formalize the study of irrationality.  
 
The apparent limitations that are imposed by starting from this premise of rationality 
are revealed by two observations: (a) an otherwise unstable or irrational enemy can 
often be intuitively understood as strategic; and (b) an explicit theory that considers 
rational decision-making and its strategic consequences unequivocally demonstrates 
that acting rationally does not necessarily constitute a universal advantage in conflict 
situations. Many of the factors of rationality suppose adverse factors in certain 
strategic situations, that is to say, it can be rational not to be rational. Additionally, 
there are defences that in strategy theory could be seen as deteriorations of rationality. 
This also demonstrates that in the face of a threat, it is not always advantageous to 
have an efficient system of communication, to have complete information regarding 
the adversary or to find oneself in the position of power to provide all and freely from 
one’s own goods. 
 
To resume, the focus taken in this article that addresses conflict strategy is an analytic 
extension of Thomas C. Schelling’s work (1960).  The strategy theory is conceived in 
relation to mutual inter-dependence. In a conflict, the behaviour of soldiers that 
compete for control of zones and territories with economic benefits is regarded as 
sufficiently rational (Collier/Skaperdas).  In this article, the strategy is related to 
incentives and motivations: money, salaries, drugs, arms, women etc.  The geography 
of the country reduces local populations to military or political objectives by the 
principal agents of the conflict.  Also the strategy follows patterns of logic in terms of 
communication and violent discourse.  Information exchanged during a war, 
including the use of arms, the communication of motives given for an attack or a 
defence, is significantly strategic (Lakoff).   
 
 
WHERE ARE WE NOW? 
Why do in some regions in Colombia seem to have such a persistent incapacity for 
economic and social growth? Collective action and growth have been severely stunted 
by the Colombian conflict in which violence is the primary instrument.  Over time, 
broader factors have also come into play.  Regions that lie in the centre of the country, 
for example cities such as Bogotá and Medellín, have been significantly developed, 
offer broad employment opportunities and are relatively superior to regions situated in 
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the peripheries of Colombia, such as Bojayá and Leticia
11
.  The geography of 
disproportionate economic development corresponds to historical and social 
deviations, the importance of which has been vastly overlooked (Lora/Gaviria, 
2005)
12
.  In part, these conditions can be explained by the evolution of 
institutionalisation and the Colombian state, and additionally by problems in the 
structure of collective action and beliefs (North, 2007).  Some critics have also 
diagnosed the problem as a lack of confidence. These precarious factors negatively 
affect the possibility to achieve a better quality of life in these zones that have been 
beaten down by the armed conflict.  As has been recently noted, the lack of a capital 
within which the citizens can have confidence, has brought perverse effects to the 
whole Colombian society (Gaviria 2005)
13
. 
However, another focus area that has been of progressive interest for many analysts is 
related with the reverse of the previous questions: How is it possible that citizens 
achieve productive activity in spite of the social order?  Which aspects condition or 
restrain the debilitation of social order?  These questions change the way that conflict 
studies addresses information that circulates in the form of propaganda, the news and 
public opinion.   For many analysts, Colombia represents a laboratory of 
investigation: contrasting markets, an entrepreneurial society, and indicators of 
optimum levels of happiness in all the regions
14
.    
 
It was during the 80’s, more so than previous decades that the para-state groups 
(insurgents, self-defence groups and criminal organisations) began to offer a lucrative 
service: private protection.  Given the vacuum left by the State and the mistrust of key 
organisations in economic development, these groups undertook illegal activities in 
various regions of the country. To start with they offered subtle mechanisms of 
protection at a low cost and afterwards they used intimidation. The paramilitaries and 
insurgents managed to integrate into local political life and in some cases their 
                                                          
11 The categories of centre/periphery are used to historically describe disequal socal relations in the regions 
that have been researched by Roldán Mary, A sangre y fuego. La violencia en Antioquia, 1946 - 1953, Bogotá, 
Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, Banco de la Republica, 2003, 435 pp.  
12 Lora’s/Gaviria’s controversial hypotheses have been the object of Estrada’s anaylisis (2007b).    
13 The contrast between these social relations has been exasperated by distrust in the principal 
confrontation zones and geographical areas where drugs are produced and trafficked. The distrust 
frequently threatens minimal existent relationships due to manipulation of information by those who 
exercise military control in these territories.  It is important to emphasise that mistrust in Colombia varies 
over time and space.  Those who arrive in Cartegena for tourism and who never leave the departmental 
capitals have no comprehension of distrust in the other regions. 
14 “Latin America, a happy region”, El Tiempo, 15/11/2008. “I am happy, we are from the third world”, El 
Tiempo, 4/06/2008. 
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intervention exceeded basic social relations,  intervening in, with or without authority, 
the resolution of disputes and quarrels fought amongst members of the communities
15
. 
 
The protection agencies caused decisive profound changes in the territorial geography 
of the country that affected regional governability.  As they amplified the number of 
their fronts in zones such as Magdelena Medio and Puerto Boyacá, they also 
expanded their radius of political influence in the Pacific Coast, the Guajira and up to 
the reaches of the south of the country in depeartments such as Cauca and Nariño.   In 
certain towns, the policies undertaken by the para-state groups served to reduce the 
incident of common delinquency (Deas, 1999). Also, they planned a redistribution of 
contracts designed to develop public work, but the plan was never followed through 
with.  These are examples that show that the para-state groups undermined the state 
whenever they deemed necessary.  The vigilence that they provided gave relative 
calm to the citizens, also forms of social and political contract in the shadow of the 
state
16
. 
This extensive global mechanism of extortion greatly exemplifies parasite forms of 
social contract.  The self-defence forces intervened in local power, saving the 
appearances of a reality that reduced governability for three consecutive governments: 
Gaviria, Samper and Pastrana.  The long-term effects have been devastating. The 
para-state groups used random methodology to manage high cost business 
transactions across various sectors and exponentially raised general mistrust.  The 
alliances and coalitions between self-defence forces and the drugs cartels or between 
insurgents and landowners spoilt legitimate constitutional order and legitimate power 
in various regions, capital cities and intermediate towns.   
An accumulation of necessities caused by unemployment or a low income in certain 
municipals create an abundance of potential human resources to be recruited into the 
                                                          
15 Truly unusual of cases like that which occurred in the municipal of Pelaya located in the south of Cesar: 
since September of the previous year, the self-defence units have prohibited the posting of philosophy and 
social science teachers in all schools.  A teacher, who had to flee from the zone, explained that the order was 
given without more details and that he had to question it, “Even Plato left running”. “Hasta Platón lo sacaron 
corriendo”. El Tiempo,  4/22/2001.  Articles written by Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, "Ciénaga Grande viaje al 
corazón de la barbarie",  Magazine NUMERO., v.28, pp.70 - 73 , 2001; “Dilemas de la guerra y la política”, 
Newspaper Cátedra Libre, Universidad Industrial de Santander, 2001; “El desplazamiento forzado en 
Colombia”, Magazin Dominical, Vanguardia Liberal, Bucaramanga, 2001-09-07; “Peque, ataque guerrillero a 
la población civil”, Analítica, Venezuela, 2001-06-10; “Viaje al corazón de la barbarie”, Jornada Semanal, 
Ciudad de México, 2001-02-11; “La retórica del paramilitarismo”, The Universidad Nacional de Colombia 
newspaper,  2001-12-15; “Argumentos sobre el conflicto”, Magazín de Vanguardia Liberal, Bucaramanga, 
2001/04/17. 
16 Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, “Guerra civil y contractualismo político incompleto”, Revista Analítica 
Premium, Caracas, Venezuela,  04/09/2008; García, Villegas, Mauricio et. al.,  Jueces sin Estado, Fundación 
Konrad Adenauer y The John Merck Foundation, Bogotá, 2008. This book collected testimonies and cases 
which demonstrate of the exercise of justice in zone dominated by para-state groups. It recognizes how the 
groups took over the State through providing a findamental pillarstone of government: justice.  
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para-state groups.  These groups manage to recruit indolence and youth, whose age 
oscillates between 13 and 20 years old, into their fronts.  By providing the local 
population with incentives aiming at satisfying their basic necessities, the self-defence 
forces and the insurgents were able to get a stronghold in strategic territories where 
they were then able to reek fear and control the illegal markets.  Within the localities, 
illegal mechanisms were adopted to resolve domestic disputes.  Those who were 
favoured by the commanders were assured power for illegal business deals and 
transactions within and outside of their zones.  This new order managed to work 
perfectly thanks to indulgent government employees and entities who soiled their 
hands in para-state activities, or merely acted dumb.   
The influence that these agencies have had on collective Colombian life has been 
negative. The local mafias, self-defence forces, insurgents and paramilitaries have 
affected regional territorial structure and conditioned new cultural standards. The 
incentives and belief that wellbeing consists in material goods, together with an 
inversion of community values, profoundly undermined the affirmative conventions 
of work, education and collective responsibility. Progressive weakening public 
confidence was caused by political agreements which assured the functioning of the 
private security agencies and para-political intervention in government. A panorama 
of this magnitude was obviously going to structurally affect the institutions.  
The territorial configuration of the protection agencies has left concomitant 
consequences.  Perhaps the most alarming is the distrust that Colombian society has 
of the state and the coalitions that formed between the elite, organised crime and para-
state groups.  A broad look at the structure of the private protection agencies reveals 
new organisational modalities and perverse mechanism of contract.  This image 
below shows new illegal groups and patterns of shared learning (Cubides, 2005).  
Additionally, the continual sequence of intra-community conflicts has puts breaks on 
development initiatives and economic and social change which would otherwise be of 
great benefit to the populations situated in the geographic periphery of the country 
where these illegal armed protection agencies are prominent. 
This lifestyle spread which caused unprecedented transformations in intermediate 
sized cities such as Pereira, Tuluá, Valledupar and Bucaramanga (where commanders 
and gangsters were given temporary refuge).  It also contributed to increased 
legalisation of paramilitary activities that oiled the machinery of their alternative form 
of governance. The informal economy and open-door boarder smuggling fused with 
legal production and economy to form a dominant symbiosis. Additionally, a 
mutually supporting system made up of the legal and the mafioso had come to 
constitute a resourceful platform for those offering security. Furthermore, abandoned 
populations provided a fruitful pool of clientele to which protection agencies could 
provide their services. The choice between anarchy or protection agencies has not 
been considered by those who make decisions in government. Above all if those 
affected count on additional resources coming from business with the same protection 
agencies  
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CONTEXT AND TRAJECTORY  
Analysing the Colombian conflict calls for a certain degree of commitment on the part 
of the researchers.  This occasionally creating a danger for them: too much curiosity 
kills.  One persistent research problem is that when explaining the way that the para-
state organisations operate, normally only inchoate information can be found.  
However, with the consolidation of the nexus between national organisms and 
international institutions, more valuable information has been uncovered regarding 
the mechanisms they employed.  The confessions of the head drugs traffickers and 
evidence divulged in the prosecutions against members of criminal organisations in 
the trials lead by the attorney general also provide us with leads
17
.  
It is possible to work from information collected from official judicial reports of the 
paramilitary and drugs trafficking trials.  The accused is rewarded with benefits for 
declaring their illegal activities, crimes and the massacres that they have participated 
in.  These confessions are valuable for our analysis.  Jorge 40, Mancuso, and Don 
Diego, all prosecuted in the United States under charges of drugs trafficking, gave 
details in their confessions that paint a more complete picture of their individual 
front’s activities and paramilitary strategy employed over the last few decades.  
Generally, the sources used in recent research what are predominantly descriptive in 
character.  However, in our case we have opted for using research initiated a decade 
ago, consisting in a referential mark based on argumentation theory, non-cooperative 
games and asymmetrical information.  When argumentation techniques and rational 
structures are used to explain violence, it is demonstrated that the para-state 
organisations operated by forming coalitions in strategic territories for drugs 
production and trafficking.  The aim of this project is to advance research of these 
new strands of the conflict
18
. 
                                                          
17 Research problems regarding sources and quality of information of civil wars have presented a 
fundamental difficulty for various reasons: first, because an unbiast researcher will not have sufficient 
information to analyse the principal perpetrators.  Second, factual information is always discovered ex post, 
after the events have occurred; therefore, motives, causes and circumstances are reconstructed in 
accordance with the narrative and interests in hand.   Thorough research always should consists in a 
scrupously diverse range of sources and reliable testimonies. See: (Estrada, 2007a). 
18 My investigative work undertaken between 1998 – 2004 concentrated on strategic aspects of the armed 
conflict using argumentation logic. The results identified discursive structures of a violent actor which were 
used to justify para-state acts.  Analytic instruments facilitated the study of ideological differences and the 
process of mutual learning adopted by both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries. A relatively original aspect 
in the methodology which was employed was the relationship between the discourse, ideology and the 
armed conflict in Colombia. Please see in particular: “La retórica del paramilitarismo”, in Revista Análisis 
Político, Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales, IEPRI, Bogotá, Universidad Nacional de 
Colombia,  vol. 44, pp. 39 – 57, 2001; The book: Metáforas de una guerra perpetua, pragmática de la 
argumentación en el conflicto armado en Colombia, Fondo Editorial Universidad Eafit, Medellín, 2004, 
contains a good part of this period of investigation.  
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An aspect of the armed conflict which we focused our reserach on was the 
reconstruction of the phenomena of rumors. Kowalski’s and Strojnowsk’s graphic 
models show that the location of threatened populations can be used to explain spacial 
ties between the armed actors and the expansion of information (Estrada, 2007ª).  
Using their models, the network of information can be visualised as a natural, 
progressive and non-lineal expansion.  The information spreads through a sequence of 
cuasal relationships and disperses in accordance with the force of individual and 
collective beliefs in a particular social network.  
The relationship between information and snitching, prima facie, falls into the domain 
of rumours.  Often people are quick to tell on their neighbours so as to obtain benefits 
or protection and security.  The accusations take on various forms, one of these being 
rumour (“they say that”, “some people are saying”, “its been said that”). The 
character of a rumour allows for little alterations or discrepancies to be made as it 
passes from ear to ear.  The consequences, even on a global scale, can be regrettable.   
The rumours are motivated by perverse collective and personal interests: first, the 
interests lie in the perks received by the informer; second, the interests relate to the 
strategy of terror which is used to intimidate victims and those who are close to them. 
The pieces of information that correlate with rumour are not always collected within 
completely structured conditions. What does that mean? As such, certain pieces of 
potentially key information are chosen and related to strategic points of the network 
that are in charge of reproducing information in adjacent areas. Así, un nodo que 
contiene potencialmente información clave puede relacionarse con puntos estratégicos 
en la red que se encargaría de reproducir la información en áreas adyacentes. Explain 
more. Out of a collection of known information, keys pieces are chosen and related to 
one another so as to justify strategy.  The direction that the information takes is not 
linear but follows capricious diversions. In other words, rumors are formed by 
interactive relationships and have evident faults: gaps in information, distortion and 
cases of individuals in a network behaving indifferently. This can be observed in the 
following diagram:  
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Even more than investigating the relationship between information and rumour 
affected by the armed conflict, the aim of our research was to discover the conceptual 
structures that underlie conflict discourse.  Based on interviews and statements given 
by paramilitaries and insurgents (Carlos Castaño, Alfonso Cano, Comandante 
Gabino), reports and both printed and digital disclosed information, we were able to 
design cartography for the metaphors and analogies employed by the violent actors. 
The research made use of Lakoff’s (1999) and Facounnier’s theories with application 
to the Colombian context
19
. 
STRATEGIC CORRELATIONS  
The research in this article has avoided being misguided down two common paths. 
First, there is a marked tendency to typify the actors as protagonists. The history of 
the self-defence forces and insurgents written by journalists is generally speculative in 
kind, characterising the criminals as Robin Hood heroes. Second, the analysis of para-
state business is prejudiced because it is considered in isolation, every group being 
judged within different strategic systems.  It is illogical to explain operational 
                                                          
19 Papers: Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, "Metáforas del Poder Político", El Estado y la Fuerza: v.1 fasc.1 p. - 
,2001; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, "La información y el rumor en zonas de conflicto: estrategias por el poder 
local en la confrontación armada en Colombia", Análisis Político v.- fasc.60 p.44 - 59 ,2007; Estrada, Gallego, 
Fernando, "Rumor e información. Estrategias por el poder local", Revista Semana pp.22 - 24 ,2006; Estrada, 
Gallego, Fernando, "El Lenguaje de la Guerra y la Política en Colombia", Reflexión Política, Universidad 
Autónoma de Bucaramanga, pp.71 - 79, 2000; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, "Discursos de una Guerra 
Perpetua", Revista UIS Humanidades, v.31 fasc.2 p. - ,2002; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, "La Retórica del 
Paramilitarismo", Análisis Político, v.44 fasc. pp.39 - 57 ,2001; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, "Metáforas del 
Discurso Político en Colombia", La Historia Contemporánea y las Ciencias Sociales, pp.198 - 220 ,2004; 
Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, Los nombres del Leviatán, Análisis de discursos de la Guerra en Colombia", 
Revista Semana; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, Las metáforas de una guerra perpetua: análisis de la pragmática 
del discurso en el conflicto armado en Colombia, Fondo Universitario Editorial Eafit, v.1, 2004; Estrada, 
Gallego, Fernando, “Propagación del rumor y la información en las guerras civiles": III Simposio 
Internacional sobre analice do discurso, Universidad Federal de Mina Gerais , p.1 - 56 , v.III , 2008.    
Graphic 3. Adaptation of: Efficient 
adaptive dispensing, against omission 
failures, Darek Kowalski, Michałł 
Strojnowsk. The dispersion of rumour 
and information are found to determine 
efficient strategic nodes. However, 
communication faults can be observed 
in the gaps of information, effecting 
duration and efficiency, (Estrada, 
2007ª).  
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mechanisms outside of their macro contexts and not consider the holistic structure of 
the various organisations.  These two aspects have received little attention, according 
[Hypothesis (4)]. 
During the initial stage of the Uribe government, the reinsertion programme in which 
various paramilitary fronts participated (which is still presently being run) was 
accompanied by triumphal rhetoric concerning the dawning of such criminal 
organisations.  Many academics support Uribe´s project to demobilize the irregular 
armies that have been the authors of numerous massacres over the last decade. 
Commissions of what have been organised for various purposes: to obtain financial 
support and respect from the international community, to create a memory for the 
victims, to offer reinserted soldiers employment in business and industry. Also, there 
was a considerable amount of media hype that covered the governmental paramilitary 
reinsertion project.  A delirious degree of confident in the project has driven many to 
conclude that no armed conflict exists in Colombia [Hypothesis (1)]
20
. 
However, reality has had a different face than the ideology. Evidence shows that the 
paramilitaries have been restructured and the coalitions between the drugs cartels and 
the emerging groups who aim to occupy territories, control illegal businesses and 
traffic drugs within the illicit international markets have been renewed
21
. Novel forms 
of competition have developed between the para-state groups, above all, amongst 
small combat units and the information systems that they use are designed to relocate 
rapidly when the enemy attacks.  By concentrating their laboratories in smaller 
localities, the protection agencies and groups of drugs traffickers manage to keep the 
market reasonable stable
22
. 
                                                          
20 Banks, C.M., Sokolowski, J.A., “From War on Drugs to War against Terrorism: Modeling the Evolution of 
Colombia’s Counter-Insurgency”, Social Science Research, 2008. This article evaluates the phenomenon of 
political anti-insurgency in bilateral Colombian-US relations, discussing the changes that drugs trafficking 
and the war on terrorism have made on the identity of the para-state groups. For an evaluation of the coca 
eradication programmes and the intervention of the actors of the armed conflict please see: Joshua D. 
Angrist and Adriana D. Kugler, “Rural Winfall or a new resource curse? Coca, income and civil conflicto in 
Colombia”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol XC May 2008 number 2. 
21 The sustainment of the illegal drugs market and smuggling has recently been documented, please see: 
Cajas, Juan, “Globalización del crimen, cultura y mercados ilegales”, Ide@s,  Concyteg, Año 3, Núm. 36, 5 de 
junio de 2008; and for research specifically regarding Colombia: Ocampo, José Antonio, Historia económica 
de Colombia, Bogotá, Planeta, 2007. 
22 Mostly due to one of the most powerful drugs cartels of the last decade: the cartel of the North Valley. The 
business of this cartel extends to Mexico, Venezuela, the United State and Europe and its operations take on 
such forms as social cleaning in regions beyond that of the Cauca Valley. Its activities were strategically 
supported by the paramilitaries and guerrillas, as described in: El cartel de los sapos, Bogotá, Editorial 
Planeta, 2008. 
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The expression of the emerging groups has inherited the operatives that the insurgents 
and paramilitaries traditionally employ: threats of the population, threatening the local 
governors, displacement of the nucleus of many local populations and assassination of 
indigenous leaders and farmers.  On top of this, intelligence work and information are 
used to selection the target victims of the group [Hypothesis (4)].  In the relocate 
strategy stage, the groups escalate the war in the predominate territory.  Even though 
the conduct of the various groups is relatively insular, they compete to offer security 
to those who can pay, and the rest of the population is available for extortion and 
threat.      
As can be observed, a decreased intensity of war coincides with the increased 
asymmetry in relation to aggressive resources and to the defensives employed 
amongst the para-state groups.  This makes sense, especially when the asymmetry is 
in the extreme, on the grounds that the groups represent only a small fraction of the 
population and their possibility of success in a military confrontation is abysmally 
low, with little probability that they take up arms.  In our case, we cannot measure the 
form of total relationship i.e. when the combating front have equal force, it also may 
be the case that they are reluctant to initiate a high cost war when the probability of 
beneficial results is hazy.  As the asymmetry grows, the strongest group may be 
tempted to act more oppressively and provoke a reaction. When evaluating the present 
stage of the conflict, we observe a difference in the increased asymmetry, which 
reaches a higher peak in relation to paramilitary activity. 
During this time the conflict has unfolded between paramilitaries groups not fully 
differentiated [Hypothesis (2), (4)]. Its territorial location techniques and their means 
of control are integrated into a process of mutual learning. Its distance is not too 
pronounced. Between the lines intersect at the right end; angle reflection of their 
actions is small. In other words, while the odds are much against the weaker group, 
the feasibility of an outbreak of confrontation could be, ceteris paribus, higher among 
the security forces and the FARC or the ELN, which between government forces and 
groups emerging (paramilitary). Empirically this happened when a coalition of 
paramilitary’s fronts found consistent with military objectives of the security forces. 
In many cases the ideological allegiances or financial incentives consistently acted in 
favor of more resources towards combative. These could be kept temporarily. Each 
group provided normative conditions of recruitment, training areas, operational, 
wages and provisions, are fighting for exclusive loyalties especially when 
confrontation intensifies. In zones of territorial influence populations experiencing 
fears of assimilation and annihilation on the other side and excluded induced empathy 
shared sensibilities and beliefs. In summary, it was reasonable during the high 
frequency of armed conflict to find expressions of support group’s para-statal´s. In 
regions such as the Serranía de San Lucas, Magdalena Medio and the Pacific Coast, 
the paramilitaries reached a "capital support" who managed to spread among the 
residents, and in times of massacres led to the fronts and differentiate their businesses 
with more careful not to be confused with the identity of the FARC or the ELN. 
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EVOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT 
Relate para-statal groups, (AUC, paramilitaries, insurgents, criminal organizations) 
with a specific period of history in Colombia is common
23
. Conventional history, 
however, tend to cause violence originating in an uneven distribution of property, the 
feudal nature of the linkages between farmers and landowners in the late nineteenth 
century. A clear social and economic inequality,, which would be extended 
considerably with the lack of a solid political and institutional system. A distant ruling 
class was promoting extreme aggravation of political fanaticism that would have 
bipartisan violence of the 50s enduring one of its expressions. 
 
But if the Colombian insurgents in its confrontation with the State are discursively 
heir to nineteenth-century wars, this trial did not have the same force in the case of 
irregular clusters, such as self-defense and paramilitary forces during the second half 
of the twentieth century. These relate to a world determined by new values: 
consumption, crime and demographic concentration of urban poverty. As a mixture of 
components that provides opportunities for those who can show more power to 
negotiate and offer protection in areas where land conflicts are being intensively 
[Hypothesis (2), (5)]. 
A fallacy promoted in the analysis suggests that the spiral of conflict grew so 
aggressive as the means employed. If during the original violence of mid-twentieth 
century, liberals and conservatives defended their beliefs by killing and topping, it is 
believed that after the 80s, vengeance and retaliation deepened thanks to the 
sophisticated weaponry that was bought with drug funds [Hypothesis (5)]. This 
interpretation is partially correct. Then as now faced by those territories and 
populations, also are motivated by revenge, scams, and duels of honor. Generations of 
violent actors who left us so-called violence to maintain their causes classical 
achieved within a context of more complex claims and disputes. 
However, as we have emphasized, the evolution of abundant evidence against 
parastatal groups contrasts with few new developments in research models. The 
literature lacks empirical basis for effect and analytical relationships are weak. 
Several authors are more interested in spreading common places to relate their 
information sources [Hypothesis (1)]. 
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 León Gómez, Eduardo Pizarro, Una democracia asediada. Balance y perspectivas del conflicto 
armado en Colombia., Bogotá, Grupo Editorial Norma, 2004, pp. 370; Las FARC (1949-1965). From 
paramilitaries: “the combination of all forms of struggle”, in collaboration with Ricardo Peñaranda 
Institute of Political Studies and International Relations at the National University. Tercer Mundo 
Editores, Bogotá, 1991, Fals Borda, Orlando, Germán Guzmán, Eduardo Umaña Luna, The Colombia 
violence, Bogotá, Taurus, pp., 488. 
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HEURISTICS 
In the context of this nature is required to work on the subject with conceptual tools of 
greater density. Academic research on the phenomena described are supplemented in 
our perspective with the following components: 
1. The idea of explaining the war in Colombia taking as basis the evolution and 
development of private protection agencies has been linked to the progressive 
generation of a potential market that starts with farmers and entrepreneurs in 
the Middle Magdalena and Puerto Boyaca, pervades the political geography of 
the Pacific Coast, between smugglers and local politicians in border areas, the 
corridors of Urabá from investments in oil palm cultivation, the departments 
of the South: Caquetá and Putumayo, with vast fields of coca, and extending 
into the areas north of Valle, Cauca and Nariño, triggering retaliation violent 
organization with a tradition since the '60s.
24
 
2. Our research on private security agencies in emerging conflicts between their 
original sources is the work of Robert Nozick: Anarchy, State and Utopia 
(1974). The analytical merits of the concept are related Nozick be fully 
explained in the main components of private protection agencies in a market 
model
25
. Besides putting the strategic, conditions of the agencies within the 
evolutionary process of a political contract incomplete. The structure of 
competition for private protection in a society with irregular conflicts 
triggered an increasing spiral of further violence by their actors. The work we 
do has made progress in a complementary direction
26
. 
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 See: (Estrada, 2007, Valencia, León, 2009; Kalmanovitz, 2001). Are not valued enough to have had 
the impact displacements stratification and population mobility. The social and economic costs of these 
phenomena: Estrada, Fernando, Alberto Castillo, Gonzalez, Jorge Ivan, La función Pública del Estado, 
Bogota, DANE Departamento de Estadística, 2008, Alejandro Reyes Posada, Guerreros y campesinos. 
El despojo de la tierra en Colombia, Bogotá, Editorial Norma, 2009. 
25
 The phenomenon is only beginning to be explored in Colombia on systematization of national and 
international sources. With known as: CMSP, private military security companies. E, the topic of 
private protection agencies a la Nozick came into full force in Colombia. 
26
 Papers of the author: Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, "¿A dónde ir?  Un análisis del desplazamiento 
forzado".  Análisis Político  Bogotá, Iepri, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, v.65 pp.146 - 151, 
2009. "Guerra Civil y Contractualismo Político Incompleto". Analítica Premium, 2008; "Estrategias 
por el poder local y conflicto Armado en Colombia".  Analítica Premium,  pp.17 - 25, 2007; "Estado 
Mínimo, Agencias de Protección y Control Territorial", Revista Análisis Político, Universidad 
Nacional de Colombia, v.56, pp.115 – 131, 2006; "El Escudo de Aquiles, Seguridad, Estado y Nuevas 
Guerras", Revista Semana/Editorial Planeta,  pp.124 - 156 , 2003; “El Soborno y la Amenaza en las 
Guerras Civiles", Primer Congreso de Ciencia Política, Bogotá, Universidad De Los Andes, 2008; 
"Agencias de Protección y Poder Político Local", Primer Congreso de Ciencia Política, Congreso de 
Ciencia Política Bogotá, Septiembre 30 - Octubre 4 de 2008; "Estrategia de Comunicación y 
Paramilitares en Colombia, Investigar la Comunicación Retos Científicos y Compromisos Sociales, 
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3. Another reference in the field of strategic games and logical behavior in 
irregular conflicts have been the work of Thomas Schelling: The Strategic of 
Conflict (1960) and Choise and Consecuence (1984). In both works we find 
ideas to understand the correlations between organized forms of crime with 
informal forms of the economy. A theory of indirect communication which 
plays a key role in cases such as threats and bribery. Successful coalitions 
between paramilitaries and drug cartels after 90, or links between smugglers 
and dealers insurgency (FARC, ELN) reflect aspects of organized crime on an 
original conflict between causal reasons. 
4. Research by Diego Gambetta on the Sicilian Mafia (2003) analytical 
framework partially meets Schelling / Nozick within targets relevant to the 
investigation of the Colombian case. We want to explore the direction taken 
by the work of Gambetta basically the following: (a) the idea of the protection 
industry as a potential markets, (b) provides comparative relationships 
between markets and market protection ordered disordered. The work we have 
elaborated on the information and rumor in conflict areas (Estrada, 2006), are 
complemented with the idea developed in the trademarks Gambetta and 
mechanisms of communication and information used by criminal 
organizations. 
A wide variety of prejudice has gained ground among proponent’s comments on links 
between clusters paramilitary and drug cartels [hypothesis (3), (5)]. A widely 
accepted belief is that the protection and security are marginal to the objectives of the 
armed conflict. This idea suggests a fragmented version of illegal markets in which 
each business unit operates independently of the others. The boss in the chain of the 
conflict only indirectly, since its objectives are focused on the delivery routes, money 
laundering or the business of smuggling at the borders. However, relations between 
the posters with the paramilitaries or between the cartels and the guerrillas, as well as 
the relationships they have minor criminal organizations with links in the chain, they 
agree on many goals
27
. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2007; "Concentración de Tierras y Desplazamiento Forzado en Colombia, Caso Antioquia", Dinámica 
del Conflicto Armado en el contexto de la política de Seguridad Democrática, Bogotá, Universidad 
Externado de Colombia, 2007; "Economía Política del Conflicto Armado en Colombia", XXII 
Congreso Nacional de Estudiantes de Economía, Bucaramanga, 2007; Análisis Actualizado del 
Conflicto Armado en Colombia", Mataron a Gaitán, Celebración 60 años, Bogotá, Universidad 
Nacional en Colombia, 2008.  
 
27
 This hypothesis of correlations and shared interests between the paramilitary’s groups and State 
Robert Nozick expresses originality in works reviewed (Nozick, 1974). While it is important to note 
that the case studies, as in Colombia, offering obvious limitations. The change in policy or strategic 
positions taken by key actors, betrayal, money laundering, concealment of information, makes the 
trajectory of research in an open challenge to solve several problems: how to keep the illegal drug trade 
with agencies different?, Who assure safety on the routes of transmission of drugs?, how corrupt 
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In Gambetta (2003) the case of the Sicilian Mafia that private protection is a "central 
activity of a well-ordered mob. Those who receive protection may be fussy, but not 
usually considered useless, and many more times than you think in general, are 
actively seeking". This observation in the Colombian case is given the apparent 
objections lawlessness among emerging groups, but some disorder in the form of 
business does not mean that the ways in which security operates a business does not 
represent high profitability. In fact it is possible to verify how the conflict with 
struggles over the monopoly of illegal businesses in municipalities and regions. 
The reason´s for this confusion is related to studies that focus on aspects of the 
problem prone to spectacular. The categories and core concepts to define the conflict 
still within a sphere comprised of platitudes. We need to go far enough with less 
journalistic study structures. Another bias underlines the absence of armed conflict; 
some analysts invoke magic solution to this formula. "Organized Crime", "emerging 
bands," "guerrillas" or "paramilitaries" are used as denominators to describe in many 
cases the same thing. The basic problem is complicated by the difficult nature found 
in the sources. A variety of reason´s in the Colombian case requires a restructuring 
and work on materials that have been "kicked by the angels" (John L. Austin, 
Philosopher). 
There is first the need for a separate conceptual framework for agents, organizations, 
cartels, suppliers and buyers of protection. And recognize that in half a century of 
shared activities, paramilitary groups have managed to bring an illegal market has its 
own dynamics among large investors. How have they affected the regional circuits of 
the illegal market of the customs protection of each region in Colombia: mayors, city 
councils, legal trade? A proper understanding of these differences also reflects a 
fundamental issue of political economy: how they have incorporated the private 
protection and illegal markets to the general structure of formal economy in Colombia 
[Problems controvert the assumptions (1), (2), (3), (5)]. 
 
TERRITORIAL EXPANSION 
This unit is close to problems of work within Garfinkel / Skaperdas (2007) in the 
sense of exploring how disputes arising from civil wars are related to defective forms 
of competition for economic resources. More specifically, the analysis made in the 
context of civil wars show a marked tendency to the formation of scale underlying 
business operating on property rights and an expanded private protection. The authors 
call this phenomenon: technologies of conflict. Our objective is similar to the extent 
that we also investigate the effects of the illegal market of private protection on 
income: the decisive aspects in the distribution of the local mafia powers or modes 
                                                                                                                                                                      
institutional representatives both within and outside the frontiers?, When coalitions are required and 
with whom?. 
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how a group relates paramilitary defects with marginal productivity in areas that 
remain in dispute. In other words it means asking how the protection operates in the 
informal markets depending on the intensity of competition and demand to the 
citizens for greater security. 
The analytical framework Garfinkel / Skaperdas, has served us well to observe the 
mechanisms of adaptability and change with the clusters within a given territorial 
area. What elements of economic behavior prevalent among combat units: the 
commanders and regular soldiers. What incentives for capital accumulation and how 
specific influences may have illegal markets between those who determine market 
decisions. The role of governors and the sharing of political powers are dangerous. 
The distribution of resources in areas under pressure from paramilitaries and 
insurgents is akin to a hobbesian war
28
. 
Recent research on dynamic changes of the armed conflict in Colombia has an 
extensive list of problems: How much has changed from political geography and 
territorial reintegration and delivery of paramilitary fronts? : "In the hands of those 
who have been protected areas and regions and exploited by the FARC and the ELN 
during the Uribe government? How has recovered the State territorial presence in 
region to compete until recently by paramilitary and guerrilla? What is this presence 
of the State itself and what government policies in regions like the Pacific and the 
Urabá Chocó? 
These questions require a look at different economic and social geography as well as 
an analysis of strategies that correlate between paramilitary movements (black eagles, 
countries, and stubble), drug cartels and guerrilla fronts. Proceed with an auxiliary 
hypothesis in our approach: the FARC military crossroads during the Uribe 
administration and the rehabilitation program of the paramilitaries has not meant the 
final stage of the conflict, but rather we sustain that such conditions have forced 
officials to change violent their operational plans and find coalitions to maintain its 
dominance and local political power, [contrary to Hypothesis (1), (2)]. 
In several recent research findings protection agencies are presented as unitary actors, 
strategies and objectives homogeneous territorial control unit and organizational unit. 
Nothing could be farther from reality. Because parastatal groups, especially during the 
                                                          
28
 The amount of challenges is broad and works tend to specialize. Research on specific problems: 
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Uribe administration have been forced to make internal adjustments in their 
foreheads, movements between middle and top (paramilitaries, FARC, ELN) and 
military coalitions in large regions of the country [Contrary to Hypothesis (5) ]. The 
strategic dynamics tend to differentiate their identities. New denominators semantic 
(black eagles) are combined with lessons learned in the field of conflict. At the same 
time, those affected in areas under parastatal control mechanisms seek to protect their 
interests and properties.  
Within this scheme of territorial projections, ranchers, businessmen, landowners and 
merchants seek again to reduce their transaction costs. The safety and security goods 
returned as attractive between paramilitaries and insurgents. Throughout the past 
century has informally evolved a system of interconnection between paramilitaries 
and insurgents seeking to replace the strength and legitimacy of the state. So the 
interests (assets, properties, businesses, families) and the funds paid are not charged 
individually. Those working the supply side know what they do: associate with each 
other, guerrillas and paramilitaries, organized criminals and kidnappers, have entered 
into close relations key strategic areas of regional geography. On rare occasions the 
division of labor depends on specialties ranging from street robbery to the slaughter, 
through kidnapping and extortion.  
It is likely that such a situation the individual incentives as a result of complete 
fragmentation affecting collective action. And the rewards of government campaign 
to gradually weaken the FARC. The individual reattachment act positively on the 
operating balance of forces although official figures for experts are exaggerated (Isaza 
2009). The central questions revolve around budgets less encouraging: rearrangement 
insurgency, territorial division and negotiations between political actors and 
commanders; escalation of conflict in ascending sequence: intimidation, extortion, 
threats, and selective killings. One of the key issues in this scenario: how intra 
organizational balances established and local resource competitions between 
parastatal groups now replace paramilitaries and insurgents?  
Research in the context of international civil wars may be promising to better observe 
our case. The relationship between clusters and semi-internal relations among 
members of an organization, as well as its geographic expansion and strategic, is 
central to understanding the trends of territorial conflict in Colombia. So part of our 
next goal is to make a partial assessment of these specific problems in the Colombian 
context. We'll see if the dynamics that determine changes locally specific aspects 
shared with other regions in the world. 
 
EMERGING BANDS  
The political disintegration of clusters paramilitaries is one of the most difficult to 
address. Should we say des-ideological? Take up arms against the state "? Or use the 
State to "fight those who oppose the State? This double movement triggers a 
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misleading way of posing the problem. If politics is lost in the conflict, what are the 
reasons? It was argued by many analysts is that the drug trade and drug trafficking 
explain everything [Hypothesis (5)]. Again, this means putting everything in one 
basket.  
And is it not so? The social have worked with differences? Mono-causal question is 
as flawed as its response, ceteris paribus, explanations that place within the same 
level: strategies, objectives, policy, armament. The need to differentiate and develop a 
reclassification (by regions, territories, incentives, resources and power), is essential. 
The changes provided in locations such as Puerto Boyacá Puerto Triunfo and after the 
paramilitary reintegration program are sufficient to understand that we were wrong to 
simplify the conflict and its resolution.  
Is it the rearmament of paramilitary? Pure drugs business? Who are their leaders less 
"spectacular"? Who pays? What area of political / military project? Questions whose 
require question´s of critical geography and logical extension in the localities. The 
explanations are divided between those positions in emerging bands fragmented 
expression of common crime and organized crime, or who were concerned to rearm 
and consolidate in former territories of the paramilitaries. The picture is cloudy. The 
truth, however, is that the actions of urban crime in border towns and illegal 
businesses, they reveal a strategic expansion whose geography has not been studied 
yet.  
Part of conventional geography has been used in order to divert attention from critical 
areas of conflict. Exploit the fears and hostility feeds. Depending on the source 
providing the information is abused mapping to develop interpretations. A map is 
presented as reality; however, the maps are not reality. It is possible that further 
studies of critical geography teach us, by example, not only in what regions or areas 
of the country there is expansion of emerging bands, but to contribute to better define 
the dynamics of transition and learning the paramilitaries groups. If paramilitary 
gangs are emerging should be able to expose what updates or changes its projections 
territorial behavior and strategic
29
. 
The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of the paramilitaries, have 
you failed? Being negative response, what explains the return of member’s 
combatants to areas that were predominantly paramilitary? There are many concerns 
expressed serious institutional difficulties to handle a problem of dimensions that 
transcend the boundaries of government. However, in the Colombian case, the gaps in 
the program seem to respond to original conceptions of the process with severe 
                                                          
29
 A test that evaluates in an international context the emerging gang problem: Hoffman, Michael H., 
"Emerging combatants, war crimes and the Future of international humanitarian law", Crime, Law & 
Social Change 34: 99-110, 2000. The reflections are concerned with the need to distinguish combatants 
and to degrade and paramilitaries groups and design problems arising from limited categories of 
international humanitarian law, 
 25 
limitations. Veterans do not surrender all their weapons. Businessmen, traders and, in 
general, economic sectors gave no support to the expectations of employment and 
occupation. And gradually the incentives of the program have been giving their way 
to new demands and proposals on the protection market. The negative influence of 
these factors, coupled with retaliation and crimes of ex-playing elements that deserve 
consideration [argument to be against the hypothesis (1)].  
If government policy is to confuse emerging drug gangs, there are reasons to test their 
hypotheses. The emerging bands, it is claimed, do not have a counter-ideology that 
separates the paramilitaries. The paramilitary groups that were formed and evolved 
from Puerto Boyacá during the '80s, until the fronts of the Calima Bloc, dominant in 
the Pacific region, "were organized around a program counter? It is not clear. First, 
because their structures are not preserved uniformity of command (each front 
emerged and responded to specific demands of those who financed their creation). 
Second, its members did not share resources from a single supplier. Third, their 
statements and not ideologically conceived. The "paramilitary ideology" was really 
more an artifact
30
. 
Some works have explored the relationship between paramilitary groups and regional 
powers
31
. Documentation found in computer files and papers (bills, notes or receipts 
book) makes a clear influence on contracting mechanisms, and resource transfers and 
municipal departments. Injected capital flows to regional economies by drug 
traffickers were protected by the warlords
32
. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Far from being ordered in accordance with strategic plans of a single organization, 
emerging bands have become increasingly common, despite the hostility caused by 
the Uribe administration and the propaganda against [Hypothesis (1), (5)] has proved 
devastatingly effective. The ideology that mobilizes its actions in regions such as 
Córdoba, Cauca, Valle, Nariño and La Guajira, not politics, not even be described as a 
counterinsurgency strategy, but rather a specific narrative of unmet basic needs. It is 
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 López, López, Andrés, El cartel de los sapos, la historia secreta de las mafias del narcotráfico más 
poderosas del mundo: el cartel del norte del valle, Bogotá, Planeta, 2008. 
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possible to believe that in conditions of desperate unemployment, for example, will 
become an effective policy
33
. 
This interpretation of suffering violence will shake if focuses on a guilty (the State) 
which in turn can isolate the causes of violence casually addressing the problem. 
These narrative units are offered as a means of justifying causes quite far from their 
origins. The emerging bands, paramilitary, guerrilla and criminal organizations have 
enough speech in favor of its strategic objectives. If suffering is seen as natural or 
without cause shall be considered a misfortune instead of injustice and produce 
resignation rather than rebellion. Therefore, mafia, guerrillas or paramilitaries claimed 
its causes in speeches that seek to prosecute, rather than assuming the status of 
perpetrators.  
It happened with the FARC from its origins in Marquetalia, with the AUC of 
Magdalena Medio, with the MAS (Death to Kidnappers), with the paramilitaries in 
Cordoba and Antioquia Urabá, with paramilitaries under Ramon Isaza and the Black 
Eagles under the command of Don Mario, every one of the main actors of the conflict 
is delivered to a discourse of guilt. Interpret the actions of their enemies as crimes, 
inserting an all-encompassing discourse on monstrosity of his actions. Outreach 
campaigns and territorial dominance, population displacement and destruction in the 
regions should be observed also by creating a myth that will help sustain the 
conspiracy.  
Demonizing its enemies and responsible for the atrocities of the war not only helped 
to neutralize the scruples to kill peasants and Indians ( "guerrillas dressed in civilian 
clothes," said Jorge 40 and Carlos Castaño). He allegedly also helped intensify 
recruitment for their cause. If the regions where groups did not operate in a limited 
way-or-with a legitimate presence of state agencies, the opportunity was unique to 
invoke the need for his presence, and the discipline imposed on populations. The 
enemy was seen as a destroyer of peaceful coexistence, the state as indifferent and 
insulated to the center. This was the condensation of their ideology. But the causes 
alleged hidden interest in the discourse of higher crime and criminal scope.  
The ideology had abdicated her political identity. Shares of emerging bands seem to 
be defined instrumentally by the drug economy and the dominance of strategic 
geography. The recruitment of youth and adolescents preferably made in depressed 
areas of Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Bucaramanga and Barranquilla, basically show that 
the conviction is not doctrinaire. For some emerging rescue their unemployment and 
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poverty, incorporating the main workforce at little risk. We have passed since the 
violence of the 60s classic, low imperatives disguised by the discourse of the Cold 
War, into a product of the first decade of the century, where conflicts of interest 
between groups paramilitaries, is reduced to the drug markets and drug trafficking 
[hypothesis (5)].  
What we sought in this review of research on the conflict in Colombia is to hire our 
work with some of the assumptions most influential among the public. In no way 
were completed articles or books released in the last decade, nor in his fullness we 
have examined the authors dealing with conflict. The hypothesis we have proposed as 
predominant versions, have been outlined leaving out details that do not affect the 
whole. In the introduction we said that these are not caricatures, but strongly held 
belief among those who put their theories about the Colombian conflict. 
We show, contrary to the hypothesis (1), which indeed we have reason to be wary of 
rumors about the end of armed conflict and the final dismantling of paramilitary 
groups. The facts of war are striking and show us that the FARC, though diminished 
in their action, remain structurally intact. And the paramilitaries were able to sell at a 
relatively low price the idea of reintegration, in fact, maintained camps Vicente 
Castaño and rear with new heads of emerging bands (Don Mario, stubble). The armed 
conflict in Colombia has taken on new faces, like Clausewitz's metaphor  
An explanation of the armed conflict [Hypothesis (2), (3)] has been complemented in 
our approach from a theory of the Schelling strategy / Nozick. We believe that 
addressing the conflict from the strategies and territorial geography promises less 
simple observations. New wars do not necessarily mean radical breaks with the 
strategy of violent actors of the 60s, but no doubt that incorporate aspects such as 
drug trafficking and smuggling, are variables whose explanation is more complex. 
Game theory and asymmetric information and discourse analysis contribute 
substantially to improved research methods.  
There are sufficient aspects of analogy. Analyst in the strategy and operations of 
guerrillas and paramilitaries, have suggested that the Colombian conflict analysis 
should show the differences between clusters paramilitary. Not only because after the 
80s, drug trafficking has played a decisive role, but because the geography of 
territories and control combinations have not been studied sufficiently. Geography of 
armed conflict should also provide tools to understand the impact of war on natural 
resources, for example. Our approach is complementary to the hypothesis (4) of the 
introduction.  
Finally, we sustain that while the drug economy has filtered the structure of semi-
groups, promoting market competition and private security protection, drug 
trafficking does not explain absolutely all sources of violence in Colombia. The 
strategy of armed conflict has its main actors incentives are deeply rooted in unequal 
economic relations. There differences between regions in the center and the periphery 
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of the Colombia and asymmetrical forms of development, poverty, unemployment 
and corruption. These are variables in which the drug is not directly involved but are 
part of historical attitudes that require our analysis. 
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